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NOTE
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 407: NEW CONTROVERSY
BESETS THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SUBSEQUENT
REMEDIAL MEASURES
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, the
admissibility of evidence in civil cases in the federal courts was governed
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a).' That rule provided that evi-
dence was admissible if it was admissible under either a federal rule or
an evidentiary rule of the state in which the federal court sat.2 Because
the determination of rule 43(a) admissibility required an analysis of ap-
plicable state and federal statutes on a case-by-case basis, the application
of the rule was both tedious and complex.3 The adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence was intended to clarify and simplify evidence law in
the federal courts.4
1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a), 28 U.S.C. (1970).
2. Rule 43(a) formerly provided, in pertinent part:
All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the statutes of
the United States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied in
the courts of the United States on the hearing of suits in equity, or
under the rules of evidence applied in the courts of general jurisdiction
of the state in which the United States court is held. In any case, the
statute or rule which favors the reception of the evidence governs and the evi-
dence shall be presented according to the most convenient method
prescribed in any of the statutes or rules to which reference is herein
made.
Id. (emphasis added). See also 1 S. GARD, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 1.14, at 24 (6th
ed. 1972) ("For all practical purposes evidence which [was] admissible in the
state where the federal court sits [was] also admissible in the federal courts, and
where there [was] a federal rule on the subject evidence which [was] inadmissi-
ble in the state court [was] nevertheless admissible in the federal.") (footnote
omitted). Cf. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Schlatter, 203 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1953)
(most favorable rule for reception of evidence governs admissibility of testimony
regarding decedent's intent).
3. See Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HARV. L. REV. 275
(1962) (rule 43(a) provided guidelines for admissibility but application led to
non-uniform results); Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining
Truth in Judicial Trials, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1966) (evidentiary reform is
needed to advance dual goals of accurate fact-finding and uniform procedures);
Wellborn, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Application of State Law in the Federal
Courts, 55 TEX. L. REV. 371, 372-73 (1977) (new rules were proposed to reduce
"eclectic complexity" of evidence law that existed before enactment of Federal
Rules of Evidence).
4. See FED. R. EvID. 102. This rule provides: "These rules shall be con-
strued to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense
and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to
(1611)
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Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence5 provides that evidence
of subsequent remedial measures is inadmissible to prove negligence or
culpable conduct.6 The evidence is excluded both because it has little
probative value with respect to the issues of negligence or culpable con-
duct, and because exclusion furthers the social policy of encouraging
people to make remedial repairs that improve safety. 7
In the ten years since Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, two issues have arisen concerning the admissibility of evidence of
subsequent remedial measures in actions based on strict products liabil-
ity theories. The first issue centers on whether rule 407 is applicable to
strict liability actions. 8 The issue has arisen because although rule 407
explicitly excludes evidence of subsequent remedial measures to prove
negligence or culpable conduct, it does not specify whether such evi-
dence should be admissible in cases based on strict liability theories.
The second issue involves the question whether rule 407 or state law
governs the admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial measures
in strict liability actions tried in federal courts on the basis of diversity
the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."
Id.
5. FED. R. EvID. 407.
6. Id. Rule 407 provides:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously,
would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subse-
quent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable con-
duct in connection with the event. This rule does not require the
exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another
purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precau-
tionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
Id. See also id. advisory committee note (stating that rule 407 "incorporates con-
ventional doctrine which excludes evidence of subsequent remedial measures as
proof of an admission of fault").
7. See FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note. The Advisory Committee
set forth two grounds on which rule 407 was based. Id. The first of these
grounds was that evidence of subsequent measures was both inconclusive and
inconsistent with an admission of guilt with respect to the issue of prior conduct.
Id. The second ground was that admissibility of such evidence would discourage
people from taking remedial safety measures. Id. The committee conceded that
the relevancy concerns alone might not have been sufficient to support exclusion
of such evidence, and denoted increased safety as the crucial policy basis for the
rule. Id. Some commentators, however, have disagreed with the committee's
policy analysis. See Note, Torts-Products Liability-Subsequent Remedial Measures
Admissible Under Allegations of Negligence and Strict Liability, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 188,
191-92 (1983) ("most potential defendants do not even know of the existence of
the exclusionary rule, and if they are aware of the rule, they are probably also
aware of the various exceptions to the rule"). See also Schwartz, The Exclusionay
Rule on Subsequent Repairs-A Rule in Need of Repair, 7 FORUM 1 (1971). For a
further discussion of the advancement of policy as support for the exclusion of
evidence of subsequent remedial measures, see infra notes 55 & 71-72 and ac-
companying text.
8. For a discussion of whether rule 407 is applicable to strict liability ac-
tions, see infra notes 12-87 and accompanying text.
1612 [Vol. 30: p. 1611
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jurisdiction. 9 The Tenth Circuit has taken the position that state law
governs the admissibility of such evidence, 10 while the Seventh Circuit
recently reached the opposite conclusion, holding that rule 407 applies
in such actions. 1
This note addresses the two issues raised by rule 407. The note
first reviews the split among the federal circuits concerning the applica-
bility of rule 407 to strict liability actions. The note then focuses on the
developing controversy involving the application of rule 407 in cases
brought in federal courts with jurisdiction based on diversity of citizen-
ship. With regard to the first issue, this note suggests that rule 407 is
applicable to strict liability actions, and that evidence of subsequent re-
medial measures should be excluded. With regard to the second issue,
the note suggests that the federal courts should apply rule 407 when
determining the admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial meas-
ures. Finally, this note concludes with the suggestion that there is a
need for the United States Supreme Court to address the two issues in
order to resolve the conflicts that each issue has created among the fed-
eral courts.
II. THE APPLICABILITY OF RULE 407 TO STRICT LIABILITY CLAIMS-
THE CIRCUIT COURT DICHOTOMY
A. The Majority Position
The courts that have held that rule 407 excludes evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures in strict liability cases have advanced several
rationales in support of their position. The Second and Fourth Circuits
have excluded evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict liabil-
ity actions reasoning that Congress intended rule 407 to incorporate
common law precedent, and that the paramount policies behind the
common law approach to encourage remedial action would be sub-
verted if such evidence were admissible.1 2 Taking a somewhat different
9. For a discussion of this choice of law issue, see infra notes 88-198 and
accompanying text.
10. See Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932-
33 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 176 (1984). For further discussion of Moe,
see infra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
11. See Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984). For a
further discussion of Flaminio, see infra notes 30-32 & 115-122 and accompany-
ing text.
12. See Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 960 (1982); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1080 (1981). Under the rationale of Cann and Werner, the application
of rule 407 to issues upon which the rule is silent should be interpreted by refer-
ence to common law precedent. Cann, 658 F.2d at 60; Werner, 628 F.2d at 856.
As rule 407 is silent as to strict liability actions, the rationale of Cann and Werner
applies to such actions. For a further discussion of Cann and Werner, see infra
notes 16-29 and accompanying text. See also Note, Subsequent Remedial Measures in
Strict Liability: Later Opinions as Evidence of Earlier Defects in Reasoning, 32 CATH.
U.L. REV. 895 (1983) (urging reliance upon common law precedent to promote
16131985] NOTE
3
Greenley: Federal Rule of Evidence 407: New Controversy Besets the Admissib
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
approach to the issue, the Seventh Circuit has emphasized that the ex-
clusion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures tends to avoid the
undesirable result of discouraging manufacturers from making improve-
ments in unsafe products.' 3 Still another rationale has been forwarded
by the Fifth Circuit, which justified the exclusion of evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures on the ground that such evidence carries little
probative value with respect to the issues properly before the court in a
strict liability action. 14 In addition, the Third and Sixth Circuits have
concluded that rule 407 applies in strict liability actions without assert-
ing any rationale in support of their conclusion.' 5
The Fourth Circuit set forth its common law rationale in Werner v.
Upjohn Co. 16 Werner involved an appeal from a jury verdict imposing lia-
bility on a defendant drug manufacturer for injuries allegedly caused by
side-effects of the defendant's product. 17 The focus of the appeal was
the propriety of the district court's decision to allow the plaintiff to in-
troduce evidence that the manufacturer had sent physicians a revised
warning after the plaintiff suffered his injury. 18  In light of the
probability of prejudice to the defendant that would result from the
jury's improper use of evidence of the revised warning, the Fourth Cir-
uniform application of rule 407 as method to advance improvements in product
safety). Cf. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee note (noting that "[t]he rule
incorporates conventional doctrine").
13. See Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1984)
(admission of evidence of subsequent remedial measures will reduce incentive to
take such measures). For a further discussion of Flaminio, see infra notes 30-32
and accompanying text. See also Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 857 (4th
Cir. 1980) ("It makes no difference to the defendant on what theory the evi-
dence is admitted, his inclination to make subsequent improvements will be sim-
ilarly repressed."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); Low, Federal Rule of Evidence
407 and Strict Products Liability-The Rule Against Subsequent Repairs Lives On, 48 J.
AIR L. & COM. 887 (1983) (policy to encourage safety measures is one relied
upon most frequently by courts to support exclusion of evidence of post-indict-
ment repairs).
14. See Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883 (5th
Cir. 1983). For a further discussion of Grenada Steel, see infra notes 33-39 and
accompanying text.
15. See Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985, 991 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting
that Third Circuit applies rule 407 to strict liability actions on basis of RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)); Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk Aktien-
gesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1980).
16. 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
17. 628 F.2d at 851. The plaintiff, Werner, sued the Upjohn Company al-
leging that Upjohn was both negligent and strictly liable for its failure to warn of
the potential side-effects of one of its drugs. Id. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged
that Upjohn's failure to provide his physician with an adequate warning of the
potential side-effects of one of its products resulted in injuries which required
corrective surgery. Id. at 851-52.
18. See id. at 853. The trial court admitted the subsequent warning under
rule 407's feasibility exception but held that the revised warning was inadmissi-
ble as evidence that the prior warning was defective. Id.
1614 [Vol. 30: p. 1611
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 6 [1985], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss6/10
cuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded for a new trial.' 9
The Werner court reasoned that, in enacting rule 407, Congress had
not intended to "wipe out the years of common law development in the
field of evidence." °2 0 Noting that both the common law and the express
command of rule 407 exclude evidence of subsequent remedial meas-
ures in claims based on the defendant's negligent or culpable conduct,
the court concluded that rule 407 precludes the admission of evidence
of subsequent remedial measures in a strict liability action. 2 ' The court
found no basis to distinguish between strict products liability and negli-
gence actions. 2 2 In fact, the court reasoned that there was an even
stronger basis to apply rule 407 and exclude evidence of subsequent
remedial measures in a strict liability suit where the plaintiff does not
need to prove blameworthy conduct.2 3
In Cann v. Ford Motor Co.,24 the Second Circuit reiterated the rea-
soning of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Werner.2 5 The plaintiffs in
Cann brought an action under negligence, strict liability, and breach of
warranty theories to recover for injuries they suffered when their Mer-
cury Marquis allegedly shifted into reverse after having been left in the
park position.26 After the jury returned a verdict for defendant Ford
Motor Co., the plaintiffs appealed the decision, claiming that the district
court erred in refusing to permit the plaintiffs to present evidence of
subsequent remedial measures taken by Ford after the plaintiff's acci-
dent. 2 7 Reiterating the policy arguments advanced in Werner, the court
of appeals affirmed the district court's decision to exclude this evi-
19. Id. at 851. The court noted that the "obvious inference" from the evi-
dence was that Upjohn was negligent for failing to use the warning sooner. Id.
20. Id. at 856.
21. Id. at 857-58.
22. Id. The court did concede that "in a negligence action the focus is on
the defendant while in strict liability the focus is on the product." Id. at 857.
The court found, however, that this difference in focus was not sufficient to make
evidence of subsequent remedial measures admissible in strict liability actions.
Id. The court concluded that under either theory of recovery, the use of such
evidence would tend to discourage defendants from making otherwise desirable
subsequent improvements. Id.
23. See id. at 857-58. The court reasoned that the policy underlying rule
407-to exclude evidence in order to encourage subsequent remedial meas-
ures-was more easily justified in strict liability actions because strict liability
involved conduct by the defendant that was "technically less blameworthy than
simple negligence." Id. It is suggested that the court implied that evidence of
subsequent remedial measures is less relevant in a strict liability action than it is
in an action for negligence. See id. at 857.
24. 658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982).
25. 658 F.2d at 60 (citing Werner, 628 F.2d at 856; K. REDDEN & S.
SALTZBURG, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 411-13 (1975)).
26. Id. at 56. The car began to move when Mr. Cann slammed the car door
to close it. Id. Mrs. Cann fell and was struck by the car as she attempted to get
out of the moving vehicle. Id.
27. Id. The court refused to allow the plaintiffs to introduce evidence that,
subsequent to plaintiffs' accident, Ford modified the design of the car's trans-
16151985] NOTE
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dence.28 The court also noted that the admission of evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures in products liability cases would present
difficult line-drawing questions because plaintiffs frequently bring ac-
tions sounding in both negligence and strict liability. 2 9
In Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co. ,o the Seventh Circuit affirmed a dis-
trict court's exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures in
an action against a motorcycle manufacturer for injuries allegedly sus-
tained either as a result of design defect in a product manufactured by
the defendant or as a result of the defendant's failure to warn buyers of
the defect. 3 1 The Flaminio court applied rule 407 to affirm the district
court's exclusion of the evidence, asserting that the admission of evi-
dence of the defendant's subsequent remedial measures would deter
other manufacturers from undertaking such repairs.3 2
The Fifth Circuit addressed the applicability of rule 407 in strict
liability actions in Grenada Steel Industries v. Alabama Oxygen Co. 33 That
decision involved an appeal by an insurance company from a district
court's refusal to permit the introduction of evidence of design changes
in gas tank valves that were effectuated after an explosion at one of Gre-
nada Steel's plants.34 In affirming the district court, the court of appeals
reasoned that, in strict liability actions, the relatively low probative value
of evidence of subsequent remedial measures warranted application of
mission and modified the owner's manual to warn drivers to turn off the ignition
before leaving the car. Id. at 59.
28. Id. at 59-60. The court noted that Congress expected courts to apply
common law principles to fill in any gaps in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at
60.
29. Id.
30. 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984).
31. Id. at 456, 470. Flaminio offered blueprints showing that after his acci-
dent Honda had increased by two millimeters the thickness of the struts that
hold the handlebars to the front wheel to decrease wobble in the motorcycle's
front wheel. Id. at 468.
32. Id. at 468-69. Although Honda did make subsequent repairs to correct
the defect, it is unclear what motivated the manufacturer to do so. See id. For a
further discussion of the encouragement of safety improvements as a policy ba-
sis for rule 407, see infra notes 55 & 71-72 and accompanying text. See also Note,
supra note 12, at 912-14.
33. 695 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1983).
34. Id. at 885. The lawsuit in Grenada Steel arose when Grenada Steel's in-
surance company brought a products liability suit against Alabama Oxygen
Company to recover the sum it paid to Grenada Steel for losses suffered when
one of Grenada Steel's plants was destroyed by an explosion and the resulting
fire. Id. Grenada Steel joined the suit to recover for damages not covered by its
insurer. Id. The plaintiffs contended that the defendant supplied Grenada Steel
with a defective valve that allowed leakage of a flammable gas, causing the acci-
dent. Id. The court held that evidence of post-accident design changes in the
gas tank valves were inadmissible absent "an issue on which that evidence would
have had sufficient probative value to outweigh its unfair prejudicial effect." Id.
at 889.
1616 [Vol. 30: p. 1611
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rule 407 to exclude such evidence.3 5 The court explained that the post-
remedial measure condition of a product is of probative value in strict
liability actions only insofar as the changed product represents indus-
try's response to safety concerns existing at the time of the accident.3
6
The altered condition of a product is irrelevant, however, when the
change reflects safety improvements developed subsequent to the time
of the accident, or as a response to business factors independent of
safety concerns. 37 Fearing that evidence of a product's later condition
would serve only to confuse the fact-finder, 38 the Grenada Steel court rea-
soned that exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures in
strict liability actions would bring rule 407 into conformity with the poli-
cies expressed in rule 403.39
B. The Minority Position
A minority of the federal circuits have rejected the rationales under-
lying the exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures in suits
involving strict liability claims. 40 In Meller v. Heil Co.,41 the Tenth Cir-
35. See id. at 888. The court explained that evidence of subsequent changes
tends to confuse the jury as to the point in time relevant to whether a product is
defective. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. The court explained that the relevant point in time in determining
whether there is a product defect is the time of the product's manufacture and
sale. Id.
38. Id. The court observed that a jury might use the evidence to infer fore-
sight and repair of a defect where, in fact, there may only have been a change
because of excessive caution or a response to a newly available supply of compo-
nents. Id. See also Note, Subsequently Remedying Strict Products Liability: Cann v.
Ford, 14 CONN. L. REV. 759, 769 (1982) (citing several factors that encourage
manufacturers to make improvements).
39. 695 F.2d at 888. Rule 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considera-
tions of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence." FED. R. EvID. 403. The Grenada Steel court noted, however, that the
evidence of subsequent remedial measures would be probative and properly ad-
missible under the express language of rule 407 when feasibility of the subse-
quent remedial measures was at issue. 695 F.2d at 888-89. Although feasibility
was not at issue in Grenada Steel, the court further noted that the feasibility of
alternative designs "may 'almost always' be in question in design defect cases."
Id. at 888 (citing K. REDDEN & S. SALTZBURG, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MAN-
UAL 180 (3d ed. 1982)). See also Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d
573 (5th Cir. 1985). The plaintiff in Dixon brought a products liability action
against the defendant for injuries sustained while driving a tractor manufactured
by the defendant. Id. at 578. On appeal from the district court's judgment for
the defendant notwithstanding the jury verdict for plaintiff, the Fifth Circuit
cited Grenada Steel for the proposition that feasibility is likely at issue in a design
defect case, and admitted evidence of the designs of tractor cabs that were used
on tractors manufactured by the defendant after the plaintiffs injury. Id. at 578,
583. The evidence of alternative designs of protective structures on a tractor
cab was admissible to prove the feasibility of the alternate designs. Id. at 583.
40. See, e.g., Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., 716 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir.
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cuit relied on a literal reading of rule 407 to conclude that some evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures should be admissible under rule
407 to prove controverted issues other than the existence of negligent
or culpable conduct. 4 2 Meller involved an appeal by an equipment man-
ufacturer from a jury verdict which found the defendant strictly liable in
tort for defective design of a dump truck dump bed assembly. 4 3 Af-
firming the district court's admission of evidence of the defendant's sub-
sequent remedial design changes in the truck assembly, the court of
appeals viewed rule 407 as embodying a balancing test that "implicitly
recognizes that there are interests that override the policy of encourag-
ing subsequent remedial measures." '44 Relying on the literal language
of the rule as the expression of this balancing test, the court reasoned
that unless the evidence is offered to prove the specific issues of negli-
gence or culpable conduct, rule 407 does not prohibit its admission. 45
The Meller court concluded that proof of the elements of a strict liability
suit involves factual issues for which use of evidence of subsequent re-
1983) (exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures is inappropriate
in strict liability action), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984); Robbins v. Farmers
Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788 (8th Cir. 1977) (evidence of remedial
measures is admissible on strict liability cause of action in suit containing both
negligence and strict liability theories). But cf. DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laborato-
ries, 697 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1983) (narrowing Eighth Circuit's position on admis-
sibility of evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict liability claims).
41. 745 F.2d 1297 (10th Cir. 1984).
42. Id. at 1299-1300. The court stated that rule 407 recognizes that "social
policy must be balanced against competing interests." Id. at 1299 (footnote
omitted).
43. Id. at 1298. Plaintiff's husband was killed when he inadvertently
touched an unshrouded cable while greasing the chassis of his truck and the bed
of his dump truck fell on him. Id. at 1299. In the district court the plaintiff
recovered damages for her husband's wrongful death on the theory of strict lia-
bility for defective product design. Id. at 1298. On appeal, the defendant com-
pany, Heil, argued that the district court erred in admitting evidence of its post-
accident manufacture changes. Id. The court of appeals held that the evidence
was properly admitted to show feasibility of alternative designs. Id. at 1302-03.
44. Id. at 1299 n.3. The court elaborated:
Rule 407 balances a social policy of encouraging repairs against a com-
peting interest in the admission of relevant, probative evidence. In
striking the balance, it announces a clear rule: repair evidence is not
admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct, but may be admis-
sible for other purposes. Under this rule, admissibility is not deter-
mined by categorizing a party's legal theory as negligence or strict
liability, but instead, by examining the contention that the evidence is
offered to prove.
Id. at 1300 n.8.
45. Id. at 1300. The court noted that subsequent repair evidence must still
meet the additional requirements for admissibility under the federal rules ad-
dressing relevancy and sufficient probative value. Id. at 1300. In Meller, the
court concluded that the evidence was offered to prove feasibility of alternative
designs, and was therefore expressly admissible under rule 407 notwithstanding
the court's general discussion of the use of evidence in strict liability actions. Id.
1618
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medial measures is appropriate. 46
In addition to the Meller court's offer of affirmative support for the
admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict lia-
bility actions, the court disputed the validity of the arguments proffered
by courts that have found rule 407 to apply to such actions. 4 7 The Meller
court argued for a literal interpretation of the rule, reasoning that its
plain language limits its application to negligence actions.48 The court
also noted that the limited relevance of subsequent remedial measures
in a strict liability action is not a basis to support exclusion under rule
407 because rule 407 is "an exception to the general rule that relevant
evidence is admissible." 49
A second argument favoring the admissibility of evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures in strict liability cases is that exclusion does
not serve rule 407's twin goals of avoiding evidence that raises mini-
mally probative inferences, and encouraging modifications that increase
safety. 50 The Eighth Circuit in Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal
Association5i echoed this argument. In Robbins, the plaintiff sued under
negligence and strict liability theories to recover damages suffered by his
cattle herd after the cattle consumed feed produced by the defendant.5 2
46. Id. For example, the court noted that "[p]roduct modifications may be
relevant... to factual issues that underlie the ultimate contention of dangerous-
ness." Id. The court further noted, however, that it did not construe rule 407 to
impose a relevancy test, as that purpose is already served by rule 402. It sug-
gested that if evidence is "relevant" as that standard is measured under rule
401, then the evidence should be admissible as long as it is not probative on
either of the two issues specifically prohibited by rule 407 (negligence or culpa-
ble conduct). Id. at 1300-01 n.8.
47. Id. at 1301 n.8. The Meller court refuted the arguments relied on by the
courts in Grenada, Cann, and Werner. Id.
48. Id. The court cited Lewis Carroll's description of Alice's meeting with
Humpty Dumpty to support its argument that the language of the rules should
be interpreted literally, and not to mean what the courts choose them to mean.
Id. (citing L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLAss 198 (Messner ed. 1982)).
The court pointed out that interpreting "negligence or culpable conduct" to
include strict liability went beyond the plain meaning of the words. Id.
49. Id. The court asserted that relevancy concerns are best relegated to
rule 402. Id.
50. See Note, supra note 38, at 769-70. One commentator has noted that "to
the extent that admission of such evidence of subsequent repairs results in re-
covery by injured plaintiffs, it can be argued that evidence of subsequent repairs
encourages future remedial actions." Note, Products Liability and Evidence of Subse-
quent Repairs, 1972 DUKE L.J. 837 (1972). The commentator argues that the
product distributor's economic self-interest in avoiding adverse publicity and fu-
ture litigation encourages repairs to the product to avoid greater total liability
than that which would result from a judgment of liability in one case in which
evidence of subsequent measures was introduced. Id. at 849-50. But see Note,
supra note 12, at 930, 936 (concluding that threat of introduction of evidence of
subsequent measures provides same deterrence to taking remedial actions in
strict liability suits as in claims predicated on negligence).
51. 552 F.2d 788 (8th Cir. 1977).
52. Id. at 789. The plaintiff offered into evidence a letter that the defendant
1985] NOTE 1619
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On appeal from a jury verdict for the defendant, the Eighth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's determination that evidence of a subsequent
remedial warning was admissible under rule 407, reasoning that the rule
was inapplicable to plaintiffs strict liability cause of action. 53 The court
of appeals rejected the Flaminio court's rationale that manufacturers
might forego undertaking remedial efforts if evidence thereof is admissi-
ble, stating:
In an age of mass production it is not reasonable to assume that
manufacturers would forego improvements in a product and
subject themselves to mass liability for a defect just because evi-
dence of an improvement is admissible in a pre-improvement
liability case. The pure economics of the situation dictate
otherwise. 54
Thus, the Eighth Circuit recognized that the defendant's conduct will be
influenced more by the possibility of future suits resulting from contin-
ued existence of the defect than by the prospect of liability for actions in
the past.5
5
In Farner v. Paccar, Inc.,56 the Eighth Circuit rejected the Werner
court's rationale that the low probative value of subsequent remedial
measures fails to justify its admission under rule 407 in products
cases. 57 The Farner court applied rule 403 and concluded that a subse-
quent recall letter was probative both of the existence of a design defect
in the vehicle in question and of the failure to warn of a known danger. 58
mailed to its sales personnel, after the plaintiffs use of the feed, in which the
defendant warned against using the feed in certain circumstances. Id. at 792.
The court held that this letter was properly admissible with respect to the strict
liability claim as evidence tending to show causation and to show that failure to
include the warning made the product defective. Id.
53. Id. at 793.
54. Id. (quoting Shaffer v. Honeywell, Inc., 249 N.W.2d 251, 257 n.7 (S.D.
1976)).
55. Id. at 793 n.10 (citing Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d
113, 121-22, 528 P.2d 1148, 1151-52, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 815-16 (1974)). Ac-
cording to the Robbins court, a manufacturer would be more concerned with bad
publicity or similar future legal actions than with liability in a single case. Id.
Under this rationale, the policy of promoting modifications to increase safety
should be a secondary consideration at best on the question of admissibility of
evidence of remedial measures. Id. Several commentators have made this argu-
ment in challenging the soundness of rule 407's policy basis as applied to strict
product liability claims. See, e.g.. Davis, Evidence of Post-Accident Failures, Modifica-
tions and Design Changes in Products Liability Litigation, 6 ST. MARY'S LJ. 792 (1975);
Note, supra note 38, at 769.
56. 562 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1977).
57. Id. at 527-28. In Farner, the plaintiffs husband was killed while driving
a tractor trailer manufactured by the defendant. Id. at 521. The plaintiff's suit
alleged that the defendant was liable because it had negligently designed the
truck's suspension and had failed to warn the decedent of the unsafe system. Id.
at 522.
58. Id. at 527. The court distinguished the case before it from one in which
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The court did not examine the probative value of the evidence with a
narrow view towards its use in strict liability actions, but employed a
general inquiry into the probative value of the evidence with respect to
its possible prejudice to the defendant. 59 The Farner court reaffirmed its
decision in Robbins, holding rule 407 inapplicable to actions based on
strict liability theories. 60
In DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratories,6 1 the Eighth Circuit narrowed
its position on the admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial
measures in strict liability cases based on a manufacturer's duty to
warn.6 2 More recently, however, in R. W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass
Corp.,63 the court reiterated its broad endorsement favoring the admissi-
bility of subsequent repair evidence in strict liability actions. 64
Several state courts also have adopted the position favoring admis-
sibility of evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict liability
cases.
6 5
the defect that was the subject of a recall letter was not found in all the vehicles
recalled. Id. at 527 n. 18. In such a case, the court explained, the recall letter has
less probative value if there is no other evidence that the condition described in
the recall letter was in fact present in the item that is the subject of the dispute.
Id.
59. Id. at 527-28.
60. Id. at 528.
61. 697 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1983).
62. Id. at 228-29. The court distinguished claims based on a manufac-
turer's duty to warn from other strict liability theories. Id. at 228. The court
reasoned that the similarity of issues in failure-to-warn cases brought under neg-
ligence or strict liability theories (essentially whether an adequate warning was
given by the manufacturer to avert injury) justified the decision to treat evidence
similarly in these types of claims. Id. at 229. Accordingly, the court held that the
revised wording on a drug insert sent to physicians subsequent to plaintiff's in-
jury was inadmissible as evidence that the prior warning was inadequate. Id.
63. 758 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1985). Shatterproof Glass involved a contract ac-
tion in which the defendant was held liable for breach of an express warranty in
connection with the sale of reflective glass panels that the defendant had sold to
the plaintiff to construct a building. Id. at 268-69. The plaintiff was allowed to
introduce evidence that the defendant had changed the materials and method by
which the panels were manufactured. Id. at 274.
64. Id. at 274. The court stated, "We have previously determined that Rule
407 does not bar the admission of subsequent remedial measures evidence in
actions based on strict liability 'since Rule 407 is, by its terms, confined to cases
involving negligence or other culpable conduct.'" Id. (quoting Robbins, 552
F.2d at 793).
65. See, e.g., Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d
1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974) (exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial
measures is based on policy considerations absent when such evidence is not
used to prove negligence or culpable conduct); Herrick v. Theberge, 474 A.2d
870, 874 (Me. 1984) (evidence of remedial measures is admissible to show both
negligence and strict liability); Matsko v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 325 Pa.
Super. 452, 473 A.2d 155 (1984) (rationales for excluding evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures are inapplicable in products liability case involving al-
legedly defective motorcycle).
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C. Suggested Resolution of the Conflict
It is submitted that the majority of the federal circuits that have ad-
dressed the issue have correctly applied rule 407 to exclude evidence of
subsequent remedial measures in strict liability actions. This suggestion
is grounded primarily upon the observation that, in enacting rule 407,
Congress emphasized its intention to further the common law policy of
prohibiting the admission of evidence tending to discourage a defendant
from undertaking desirable remedial measures that would lessen the
chance of future incidents similar to that which gave rise to the immedi-
ate litigation.6 6 In addition, the suggestion is supported by the observa-
tion that no principled basis exists to distinguish negligence and strict
liability actions with respect to the admissibility of evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures. 6 7
As noted in the previous sections of this note, the courts holding
that rule 407 does not exclude evidence of subsequent remedial meas-
ures in strict liability actions have focused on two arguments to support
the evidence's admissibility: (1) the admission of such evidence will not
discourage defendant-manufacturers from making repairs or modifica-
tions, as the threat of future liability will provide sufficient incentive to
repair defective products, 68 and (2) the probative value of evidence of
subsequent remedial measures justifies its admission in strict liability ac-
tions. 69 It is suggested, however, that both of these arguments are with-
out merit. Moreover, as the Fourth Circuit noted in Werner, both of the
arguments favoring the admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial
measures in strict liability actions are equally applicable to actions based
on negligence theories, yet those arguments never have been accepted
to support the admission of such evidence in negligence actions. 70
1. Application of Rule 407 to Strict Liability Actions Furthers Congressional
Policy to Exclude Evidence Tending to Discourage Subsequent
Remedial Measures
While there exists no empirical proof that the admissibility of evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures actually has an influence upon a
defendant's decision to take or forego such measures, 7 1 nonetheless it is
66. For a discussion of the impetus for manufacturers to make subsequent
remedial measures, see infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
67. For a discussion of the unimportance of distinctions between negli-
gence and strict liability actions in this context, see infra notes 74-87 and accom-
panying text.
68. For a discussion of this argument, see supra notes 54-55 and accompa-
nying text. See also Note, supra note 12, at 939 (discussing manufacturers' incen-
tive to repair defective products).
69. For a discussion of this argument, see supra notes 57-59 and accompa-
nying text.
70. See Werner, 628 F.2d at 856-58.
71. See, e.g., Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d
1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974); Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716
12
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suggested that in enacting rule 407 Congress determined that the exclu-
sion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures would avoid discour-
aging manufacturers from making repairs. 72  Based on this
determination, Congress mandated that evidence of subsequent reme-
dial measures be inadmissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct.
As there is no principled basis upon which to distinguish between cases
in which manufacturers are sued under strict liability or negligence theo-
ries, 73 it is submitted that the policy of excluding evidence in negligence
actions should apply equally to exclude the introduction of such evi-
dence in strict liability actions.
2. Negligence Versus Strict Liability: A Distinction Without a Difference With
Respect to Rule 407
Rule 407 expressly prohibits the admission of evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures to prove negligence or culpable conduct, with-
out regard to the probative value of such evidence with respect to those
issues.74 The rule does direct the courts to consider the probative value
of such evidence, however, when two criteria are met: (1) when negli-
gence or culpable conduct is not in issue, and (2) in a case where negli-
gence or culpable conduct is in issue, when the evidence is offered for
"another purpose." 7 5
F.2d 1322, 1328 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984) ("there is no
evidence which shows that manufacturers even know about the evidentiary rule
or change their behavior because of it"); Note, The Case for the Renovated Repair
Rule. Admission of Evidence of Subsequent Repairs Against the Mass Producer in Strict
Products Liability, 29 AM. U. L. REv. 135 (1979) (suggesting that impetus provided
by exclusion of subsequent remedial measures evidence is unnecessary to en-
courage repairs by manufacturers sued in strict products liability actions). Note,
supra note 38, at 785 ("The market forces that will encourage the manufacturer
to take subsequent remedial measures are not dependent on the theory of prod-
uct liability litigation."). See also ME. R. EVID. 407(a) advisor's note (rule 407 is
not necessary to encourage repairs).
72. See FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee note (primary purpose behind
rule 407 is to encourage subsequent remedial measures). See also Flaminio, 733
F.2d at 469 ("A major purpose of Rule 407 is to promote safety by removing the
disincentive to make repairs .... ). Congress enacted the rule without altera-
tion. FED. R. EVID. 407 federal judicial center note. Although adoption of the
language of a rule does not necessarily mean that Congress adopted the Advi-
sory Committee note that accompanied the rule, the note is illustrative of the
reasoning underlying the rule. This is especially true where, as here, Congress
enacted the rule as written by the Committee without making any revisions.
73. For a discussion of the lack of a principled basis to distinguish between
these two actions with respect to rule 407, see infra notes 74-87 and accompany-
ing text.
74. See FED. R. EvID. 407.
75. See id. The rule lists several exceptions to the general rule of inadmissi-
bility. Id. Authorities are divided on the question whether the enumerated ex-
ceptions in rule 407 are an exclusive or an exemplary list. See, e.g., 1 D. LouISELL
& C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 41, at 297-98 (1977) (reading rule 407 to
expressly provide that evidence of subsequent repairs is admissible for any pur-
pose other than proving negligence or culpable conduct). But see Comment, Fed-
13
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It is submitted that the probative value of evidence of subsequent
remedial measures is no stronger in strict liability actions than it is in
negligence actions, 76 and that a court's determination whether to admit
such evidence in strict liability actions should focus not on the probative
value of the evidence, but rather on whether the offering party's in-
tended use of the evidence is more like proof of negligence or culpable
conduct than it is the "other" purposes. If it is more like proof of negli-
gence or culpable conduct, it should be inadmissible without regard to
its probative value. 77 On the other hand, if the evidence is introduced
for other purposes, then while its probative value is sufficiently high to
make it relevant, the evidence still might be inadmissible under rule 403.
In Cann and Werner, the Second and Fourth Circuits noted the over-
lap and similarities between actions based on strict liability and negli-
gence theories. 78 The Seventh Circuit also noted this similarity in
eral Rule of Evidence 407 and Its State Variations: The Courts Perform Some "Subsequent
Remedial Measures" of their Own in Products Liability Cases, 49 UMKC L. REV. 338,
341 (1981) (sufficient alternative sources of evidence exist by which plaintiffs in
strict liability cases can prove their claims, therefore rule 407 should be strictly
interpreted to avoid prejudice to defendant). It is suggested that the language
of the rule implies that exceptions to the exclusion of evidence of subsequent
measures are not limited to those stated in the text. The "such as" language in
the second sentence indicates that the list of specified exemptions was not in-
tended to be exhaustive but merely to serve as examples. Id. The Advisory
Committee's note also uses words of inclusion rather than words of exclusion to
describe the rule's exceptions. See FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee note
("Other purposes are, however, allowable, including .... ").
76. Cf. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note. Under a "liberal" the-
ory of relevancy, subsequent actions might be relevant to raise the inference of
an admission of prior fault from the later remedial measure. Id.
77. Note, supra note 12, at 939 ("Although low probative value may be a
sufficient basis for exclusion [of otherwise admissible evidence], consideration of
probative value is an insufficient basis for admission."). See also id. at 938 (argu-
ing that rule 407 reflects Congress' desire to exclude any use of subsequent
repair evidence that would cause defendant threatened with liability to defer re-
medial action).
78. See supra notes 20-23 & 29 and accompanying text. This distinction was
first raised in 1974 in Ault v. International Harvester Co., where the Supreme Court
of California held that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is admissible
in a strict products liability suit. 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr.
812 (1974). The state's exclusionary rule, like rule 407, denied the admission of
this evidence to prove negligence. In Ault, however, the court found that the
rule was not applicable because negligence was not at issue in a strict liability
suit. Id. at 118, 528 P.2d at 1151, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814. The reasoning of the
Ault court also was adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Robbins, 552 F.2d 778 (evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures admissible in strict liability case).
The doctrine of strict liability imposes liability on the seller of a defective
product for harm caused because of a defect in that product. RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Liability is imposed regardless of the seller's
care with respect to the product's manufacture or sale. Id. As one court noted,
the doctrine of strict liability provides:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects,
proves to have a defect which causes injury. ...
14
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The similarities between strict liability and negligence actions are
especially striking where the theory of recovery in the strict liability ac-
tion is the defendant's failure to warn of a defective condition.8 0 To
hold a manufacturer strictly liable for his failure to warn of a risk con-
cerning a product, the plaintiff must prove that the manufacturer knew
or should have known of the risk about which it failed to warn. 8 ' Thus,
the plaintiff must effectively prove the manufacturer's negligence in fail-
ing to warn of the risk.8 2 Other strict liability theories bear similar re-
semblance to negligence theories. 83
Given the similarity between strict liability and negligence actions, it
is suggested that the use of evidence of subsequent remedial measures
The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries
resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that
put such products on the market rather than by the injured
persons ....
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62-63, 377 P.2d 897, 900-
01, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700-01 (1962). The rationale for imposing liability is that
manufacturers are in the best position to bear the cost of liability and to correct
any defects. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
79. Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 467 ("in a defective design case, there is no practi-
cal difference between strict liability and negligence") (quoting Birchfield v. In-
ternational Harvester Co., 726 F.2d 1131, 1139 (6th Cir. 1984)).
80. See Werner, 628 F.2d at 858.
81. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAw OF TORTS 697 (5th ed. 1984). The
defendant is not liable unless the plaintiff shows that the defendant knew, or
should have known by exercising reasonable care, of the risk about which he
failed to warn and that an ordinary reasonable person would have taken precau-
tions that the defendant failed to take. Id. at 697.
82. The difference between a strict liability action and an action for negli-
gent failure to warn is that in the strict liability action a reseller is liable for
reselling a product that lacked adequate warnings despite the reseller's lack of
negligence with respect to the provision of the warning. Id.
83. For example, the plaintiff may want to recover damages from a defend-
ant car dealer if the defendant sells the plaintiff a used car that loses its brakes as
the plaintiff is driving the car home from the lot. To establish the defendant's
conduct was negligent the plaintiff must prove that: 1) the defendant had a legal
duty to conform to a particular standard of conduct; 2) the defendant breached
that duty; 3) the breach was the legal cause of resulting injury; and 4) actual
injury resulted to the plaintiff. Id. at 164-65. To hold the defendant strictly
liable the plaintiff must prove that: 1) a defective condition existed at the time
the defendant surrendered possession to the plaintiff; 2) the defective condition
was the legal cause of a damaging event; and 3) the plaintiff's injury resulted
from a dangerous condition of the product that was supplied or manufactured
by the defendant. Id. at 712. Therefore, under either theory the plaintiff will
have to prove that a flaw in the manufacture or maintenance of the automobile
resulted in injury to the plaintiff. The sole difference is that in the negligence
action, the plaintiff must also prove that the defendant had a duty that was
breached by creating or failing to discover the flaw. Much of the same evidence
would be needed under either theory to prove the existence of the flaw, the
cause of the damage, and the extent of the resulting injury to the plaintiff. It is
submitted that these similarities outweigh the contrasting factor with respect to
the relevance of the defendant's conduct.
1985] NOTE 1625
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in a strict liability action is more like use to prove negligent or culpable
conduct than it is like use for the other purposes permitted under rule
407. Therefore, it is submitted that the probative value of the evidence
is not relevant to determining its admissibility.
If, as the Fifth Circuit asserted in Grenada Steel, feasibility of an alter-
native design at the time the product was introduced into the market
almost always is at issue in design defect strict liability cases,8 4 then
upon a showing that feasibility actually is controverted, the evidence of
subsequent remedial measures should be admitted just as it would be
admitted in a negligence action where the same showing is made. As-
suming arguendo that the Fifth Circuit is correct, evidence of subsequent
remedial measures will tend to be admitted more often in strict liability
actions than it is in negligence actions. This results not from a different
standard for admissibility, but because the use is proper more often in the
former case than it is in the latter. Thus, it is submitted that the same
inquiries with respect to the evidence's use must be made in a strict lia-
bility action as would be made in a negligence action.
It should be recognized that a distinction between negligence and
strict liability actions does exist insofar as strict liability actions were de-
veloped to reduce the plaintiffs burden of proof in order to promote the
plaintiffs recovery for injuries sustained as a result of product defects. 8 5
It is submitted, however, that rule 407 does not increase the plaintifFs
burden of proof. It is further suggested that it is not the role of the
Federal Rules of Evidence to reduce the plaintiffs burden of proof in
strict liability actions.
The plaintiffs burden of proof is lessened in a strict liability action
because of the definition of the elements a plaintiff must prove to estab-
lish a prima facie case.8 6 Rule 407 does not alter the elements that the
plaintiff must prove. In fact, the elements of a strict liability action are
determined by state law.8 7 Therefore, it is submitted that while rule 407
84. Grenada Steel, 695 F.2d at 888.
85. See generally, Note, supra note 38, 771-82 (reviewing development of
strict liability theories). For a brief synopsis of the doctrine of strict liability, see
supra note 78.
86. See generally Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Re-
quirenent of a Defect, 41 TEX. L. REV. 855 (1963) (describing plaintiffs burden of
proof in strict liability actions). In a negligence action the plaintiff has to prove
that defendant did not conform to what an ordinary reasonable prudent person
would have done under similar circumstances. Id. To establish a strict liability
action the plaintiff does not have to prove that the defendant's actions violated a
standard of reasonable conduct. Id. This removes the principal problem in neg-
ligence cases: "the inability or impossibility in most instances of discovering
direct or even circumstantial evidence of a specific act or omission on the part of
anyone related to those processes that could be evaluated and found to be negli-
gence." W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra not 81, at 695.
87. Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 176 (1984). For a discussion of Moe, see infra
notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
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does not further reduce the plaintiffs burden of proof, or otherwise aid
the plaintiffs recovery in strict liability actions, rule 407 properly pre-
serves the plaintiff's burden of proof in such actions.
III. THE APPLICABILITY OF STATE LAW: Is RULE 407 SUBSTANTIVE OR
PROCEDURAL?
The question of whether rule 407 or state rules of evidence should
be applied in diversity cases in the federal courts was first addressed by
the Seventh Circuit in 1980, in a dissenting opinion in the case of Oberst
v. International Harvester Co. 88 The issue remained largely overlooked af-
ter Oberst, until 1984,89 when the Tenth90 and Seventh9 ' Circuits and a
district court in Maine 9 2 confronted the issue. Unfortunately, the two
circuits reached differing conclusions, creating a split of authority
among the federal circuits, with the district court siding with the Seventh
Circuit.
A. The Tenth Circuit Approach: State Evidentiary Law Governs the
Admissibility of Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures in
Diversity Actions in Federal Court
In Meller v. Heil Co. ,93 the Tenth Circuit acknowledged the existence
of the potential conflict between application of rule 407 and state evi-
88. 640 F.2d 863, 867 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1980).
89. In the interim, several opinions discussed the general applicability of
the Federal Rules of Evidence in diversity actions, but none focused on rule 407.
See In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, Ill., 701 F.2d 1189, 1193 (7th Cir.)
(reviewing cases in which courts held that Federal Rules of Evidence governed
admissibility of evidence in diversity actions), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 866 (1983).
Air Crash concerned the applicability of federal law to a determination of whether
evidence of income tax liability is admissible when damages are computed for
earnings lost because of a decedent's premature death. Id. at 1192. Although
the court's opinion seemed to favor application of federal law over that of the
state, the court did not resolve the issue of which rule should apply because the
state law was identical to the federal law in Air Crash. Id. at 1195.
90. See Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 176 (1984). See also Meller v. Heil Co., 745
F.2d 1297 (10th Cir. 1984) (acknowledging the issue, but reserving judgment as
no conflict existed between rule 407 and state evidentiary law).
91. See Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984). Cf.
Public Serv. Co. v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 773 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1985) (apply-
ing rule 407 without discussing this issue).
92. See Rioux v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 582 F. Supp. 620 (D. Me. 1984); French
v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 101 F.R.D. 369 (D. Me. 1984).
93. 745 F.2d 1297 (10th Cir. 1984). Meller involved a product liability ac-
tion by a widow against the defendant-manufacturer of a dump truck. Id. at
1298. The action arose from a fatal incident in which the bed assembly from a
truck manufactured by the defendant fell and crushed the plaintiff's husband.
Id. The plaintiff sought to prove that the design of the truck was defective and at
trial the court permitted the plaintiff to introduce evidence of the defendant's
subsequent design changes in the dump bed assembly. Id. at 1299. The court
also issued a limiting instruction, cautioning the jury that the evidence was to be
17
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dentiary law, but the court reserved judgment on the issue, noting that
rule 407 and the state statute in question were not in conflict in the case
at bar.94
Two weeks after deciding Meller, the Tenth Circuit again was con-
fronted with the issue of the admissibility of evidence of subsequent re-
medial measures in a diversity action in Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-
Breguet Aviation.95 Moe involved an appeal from a jury verdict for the
defendant in a wrongful death action arising from the crash of an air-
plane manufactured by the defendant.96 At trial, the plaintiff had sought
to introduce evidence that subsequent to the crash the defendants pub-
lished a strong warning concerning problems with its autopilot sys-
tem.97 The trial court excluded the evidence, however, on the basis of
rules 407 and 403.98
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court erred
in applying the federal rule, stating, "If the law of the state supplies the
rule of decision, there is no justification for reliance on Rule 4 0 7 ." 99 In
support of its conclusion, the court noted that "[t]he purpose of Rule
considered only with regard to the question of whether a feasible design alterna-
tive existed at the time the truck was placed into the market. Id.
94. Id. at 1301. The court stated, "We need not reach the difficult and im-
portant issue concerning the reach of the Federal Rules of Evidence raised by
Heil's claim because we do not believe the court violated [the state statute] in
admitting the disputed evidence .. " Id. (citations omitted). The state statute
in question prohibited the admission of evidence of scientific advancements aris-
ing subsequent to the time that a product in issue was sold by the manufacturer.
Id. (citing COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-404 (Supp. 1982)).
95. 727 F.2d 917 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 176 (1984).
96. 727 F.2d at 920. The plane, a French-manufactured "Falcon 10" twin
engine turbofan-powered aircraft, crashed near Denver, Colorado, killing its two
pilots and two passengers. Id. The plaintiff brought suit against the airplane's
manufacturer, asserting multiple theories of negligence and strict liability. Id.
97. Id. at 930. The warning was published on March 1, 1978, nearly a year
after the fatal crash that killed the plaintiffs decedent. See id.
98. See id. at 930-31. The Tenth Circuit summarized the district court's ac-
tion as follows:
Prior to trial the court expressed its views that [the evidence]
would not likely be admitted inasmuch as Plaintiffs alleged causes of
action based both on negligence and strict liability and the policy un-
derlying Fed. R. Evid. 407, was not to discourage persons from taking
remedial measures. The trial court recognized, however, that its ruling
would be guided by the balancing required under Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Id. at 931.
From the Tenth Circuit's summary of the district court's action, it appears
that the district court properly recognized the force of prior decisions in the
Tenth Circuit which held that rule 407 was inapplicable in strict liability actions,
but that rule 403 could be utilized to exclude evidence of subsequent remedial
measures in such actions. For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit's position on the
applicability of rule 407 in strict liability actions, see supra notes 41-49 and ac-
companying text.
99. 727 F.2d at 932. Because the applicable state law, at the time of the
crash, did not conflict with federal rule 407, the evidence was nevertheless found
inadmissible in this suit. Id. at 933. However, the state law had been altered
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 6 [1985], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss6/10
1985] NOTE 1629
407 is not to seek truth or to expedite trial proceedings; rather, in our
view, it is one designed to promote state policy in a substantive law
area."10 0 The court added:
We hold that when [a conflict exists between rule 407 and state
law], because Rule 407 is based primarily on policy considera-
tions rather than relevancy or truth seeking, the state rule con-
trols because (a) there is no federal products liability law,
(b) the elements and proof of a products liability action are
governed by the law of the state where the injury occurred and
these may, and do, for policy reasons, vary from state to state,
and (c) an announced state rule in variance with Rule 407 is so
closely tied to the substantive law to which it relates (product
liability) that it must be applied in a diversity action in order to
effect uniformity and to prevent forum shopping.' 0 1
Rejecting the notion that the Supreme Court's decision in Hanna v.
Plumer'0 2 mandated the application of rule 407,103 the Moe court ob-
served that "while the sufficiency of the evidence is tested against the
federal standard in a diversity case, the underlying cause of action, with
its attendant elements and requirement of proof in a diversity case, is
governed by state law."' 1 4 The court ultimately focused its attention
since the time of the crash, and the court suggested that similar evidence might
be found to be admissible under the new state law. Id.
100. Id. at 932 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The court also noted
that "when state courts have interpreted Rule 407 or its equivalent state coun-
terpart, the question whether subsequent remedial measures are excluded from
evidence is a matter of state policy." Id. (citing Rexrode v. American Laundry
Press Co., 674 F.2d 826 (10th Cir.) (holding that absent state law that provides
otherwise, state evidentiary law will be applied to determine admissibility of sub-
sequently promulgated national industry standards in diversity-based products
liability case), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 862 (1982)).
101. Id. (citing Rexrode v. American Laundry Press Co., 674 F.2d 826 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 862 (1982)).
102. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
103. See 727 F.2d at 932. According to the Moe court, Hanna stands for the
proposition that "where the federal and state rules both govern the issue in dis-
pute, and are in direct conflict, the federal rule applies in a diversity based case if
the federal rule is arguably procedural in nature." Id. (emphasis added). For a
further discussion of Hanna, see infra notes 125-38 and accompanying text.
104. 727 F.2d at 932 (citations omitted). See also McInnis v. A.M.F. Inc.,
765 F,2d 240 (1st Cir. 1985). The First Circuit distinguished the Moe analysis,
involving the application of rule 407, from Mclnnis, which involved the applica-
tion of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 in a diversity action. Id. at 246 n.8. The
court reasoned that rule 403 was strictly an evidentiary rule without underlying
policy considerations. Id. at 246 & n.8. In its analysis of the choice of law ques-
tion, the Mclnnis court concluded that the Hanna test was the proper test of the
constitutionality of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at 245 n.5. In support of
its conclusion the court cited the Seventh Circuit's decision in Flaminio as well as
several cases from other circuits that had indicated, without discussion of the
issue, that a federal rule of evidence was applicable in diversity actions. Id. at
245 (citing Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 885 (5th
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upon the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 10 5 which established, for the first time, that situations exist
where it would be unconstitutional for a federal court to disregard state
law in a diversity action.' 0 6 Relying upon a respected evidence treatise,
the Moe court concluded that reliance upon rule 407 in a diversity action
would "result in an unwarranted incursion into the Erie doctrine."' 10 7
B. The Seventh Circuit Approach: Rule 407 Governs the Admissibility of
Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures in Diversity Actions in
Federal Courts
In Oberst v. International Harvester Co.,108 Judge Swygert addressed
the issue of the potential conflict between application of rule 407 and
state evidentiary law in a lengthy footnote to his dissenting opinion. 10 9
Judge Swygert observed that the Supreme Court's decisions in Hanna v.
Plumerl 10 and Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. I 1I established the principle that
"where ... a federal and state rule both govern the issue in dispute and
Cir. 1983) (Federal Rules of Evidence apply in diversity cases); Ballou v. Henri
Studios, Inc., 656 F.2d 1147, 1153 (5th Cir. 1981) (rule 403 is procedural and,
therefore applies in diversity cases); Gibbs v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 544 F.2d
423, 428 n.2 (9th Cir. 1976) ("In diversity cases, we apply the Federal Rules of
Evidence when, as here, they cover the points in dispute.")).
105. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
106. See generally id. For a further discussion of Erie, see infra notes 139-51
and accompanying text.
107. 727 F.2d at 932 (citing 2 D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 75,
§ 166, at 258). The court quoted extensively from a portion of the Louisell &
Mueller text in which the authors argue that "there may well be valid constitu-
tional reasons why Rule 407 cannot be applied in cases where state law supplies
the rule of decision." Id. at 932-33 (quoting 2 D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER, supra
note 75, § 166, at 263). For the full text of the argument advanced by Professors
Louisell and Mueller, see 2 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 75, § 166, at
261-64 (1978).
It should be noted that the Moe court's entire discussion of the choice of law
issue can be considered dicta because the state and federal rules in that case
were not in conflict. 727 F.2d at 933. The court noted that the choice of law
considerations did not affect the outcome of the case. Id. at 931. In his concur-
ring opinion, Judge McKay stated that he could not join the majority opinion
because it chose to resolve the choice of law question. Id. at 936 (McKay, J.,
concurring).
108. 640 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1980).
109. See id. at 867-68 n.2 (Swygert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The Oberst majority did not find it necessary to address this issue.
110. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). For a further discussion of Hanna, see infra notes
125-38 and accompanying text.
111. 446 U.S. 740 (1980) (noting that Hanna analysis does not apply where
scope of a Federal rule of Civil Procedure is sufficiently narrow that it does not
control an issue; in such cases Erie analysis applies). The Walker court stated
that, in determining the scope of a federal rule, the court did not mean to sug-
gest that the rules should be "narrowly construed in order to avoid a 'direct
collision' with state law. The Federal Rules should be given their plain mean-
ing." Id. at 750 n.9.
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are in conflict, the federal rule is applied in a diversity case if it is arguably
procedural."112 Finding rule 407 to satisfy the "arguably procedural"
standard," 13 Judge Swygert concluded that where such a conflict arises
in an action tried in federal court, "[rule 407], and not a conflicting state
rule, probably applies."' "14
In Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 1 5 the Seventh Circuit's analysis of
this issue resembled an expanded version ofJudge Swygert's analysis in
Oberst.1 6 Flaminio involved an appeal from a jury verdict for the defend-
ant in a strict liability action in which the district court excluded the
plaintiff's proferred evidence of subsequent remedial measures under-
taken by the defendant." i7 The appellant-plaintiff argued that the Sev-
enth Circuit should adopt the Tenth Circuit's position in Moe 1I8 and
reverse the district court on the ground that the evidence was admissible
under the applicable state law.' '9 Like Judge Swygert in Oberst, the
Flaminio court concluded that rule 407 was sufficiently procedural to sat-
isfy the Hanna test of constitutionality.' 20 The court stated:
112. 640 F.2d at 867 n.2 (Swygert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
113. Id. at 868 n.2 (Swygert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Swygert stated, "Although Rule 407 is based primarily upon policy
grounds, it is arguably evidentiary (i.e. procedural)." Id.
114. Id. Judge Swygert declined to decide which rule would govern be-
cause there was no conflict between rule 407 and the state rule in that case. Id.
Nonetheless, he opined that rule 407 would probably be applied. Id.
115. 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984).
116. While the Flaminio court applied an analysis similar to that employed
by Judge Swygert in Oberst, the court did not mention Oberst in any portion of its
discussion of the issue. See generally id.
117. See id. at 468. For a further discussion of the facts of Flaminio, see supra
notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
118. 733 F.2d at 470. The court noted that the plaintiff was arguing with
support from the "considered dictum" in Moe. Id.
119. Id. (citing Wis. STAT. § 904.07 (1975)). The court noted that although
the state statute "is worded identically to Rule 407 .... the [state] Supreme
Court has held that it does not apply in the case of a mass-produced product."
Id. (citing Chart v. General Motors Corp., 80 Wis. 2d 91, 102, 258 N.W.2d 680,
684 (1977)). The court further noted that a more recent decision by the Wis-
consin Supreme Court "broadened this holding to all product liability cases in
which at least one of the plaintiff's liability theories is strict liability." Id. (citing
D.L. by Friederichs v. Hueber, 110 Wis. 2d 581, 610-14, 329 N.W.2d 890, 903-
05 (1983)).
120. Id. For a further discussion of Hanna, see infra notes 125-38 and ac-
companying text.
Recognizing the potential inconsistency between Hanna and Erie, the
Flaminio court stated:
We are reluctant to cast a cloud over the whole federal rulemaking en-
terprise and open a new chapter in constitutional jurisprudence by
holding that a procedural rule is beyond even the power of Congress to
enact for application to diversity cases, because the rule affects substan-
tive questions that the Erie doctrine reserves to the states.
733 F.2d at 472.
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An important though not the primary reason for the rule was
distrust of juries' ability to draw correct inferences from evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures. Although it was a
mild distrust, as shown by the exceptions built into the rule, it
is enough to establish the rule's constitutionality in diversity
cases. 121
The court reasoned that, under Hanna, Congress has the authority to
prescribe rules so long as the rules are arguably procedural; it is not
fatal to a rule if it also has some substantive effects. 122
Nineteen months after deciding Flaminjo, the Seventh Circuit reaf-
firmed its determination that rule 407, and not state law, governs the
admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict lia-
bility actions tried in federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdic-
121. 733 F.2d at 472. In an earlier portion of its opinion, the court noted
that the advisory committee notes to rule 407 indicate that the rule primarily is
based "on a social policy of encouraging people to take ... steps in furtherance
of added safety." Id. at 471 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee
note) (citing C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE 666 (Cleary
2d ed. 1972)). The court added, however:
[T]he substantive judgment that underlies Rule 407 is entwined with
procedural considerations. It is only because juries are believed to
overreact to evidence of subsequent remedial measures that the admis-
sibility of such evidence could deter defendants from taking such meas-
ures. As the Advisory Committee and others have argued .... to infer
negligence from such measures is to commit the fallacy, to which juries
have long been thought prone, of believing that "because the world
gets wiser as it gets older, therefore it was foolish before." Congress's
judgment that juries are apt to give too much weight to such evidence is
a procedural judgment, that is, a judgment concerning procedures
designed to enhance accuracy or reduce expense in the adjudicative
process.
Id. (quoting Hart v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry., 21 L.T.R. (n.s.) 261, 263 (Ex.
1869)) (citations omitted).
The court further noted, "Although Rule 407 has substantive consequences
by virtue of affecting incentives to take safety measures after an accident occurs,
this just puts the rule in that borderland where procedure and substance are
interwoven." Id. For a discussion of the significance of a finding that a rule lies
in the "borderland," see infra note 134 and accompanying text.
122. 733 F.2d at 471. The court noted that under article III of the Consti-
tution, Congress' power to regulate the existence of the lower federal courts
implied a broad power to regulate procedure in these courts. Id. In support of
its reasoning, the court cited other federal rules that had been upheld as primar-
ily procedural despite their substantive effects. Id. at 472. In particular, the
Flaminio court pointed to rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
rule governing compulsory physical examinations during discovery, which had
been held to be validly applied in federal diversity cases. Id. (citing Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941)). The court observed that even though applica-
tion of rule 35 could force a plaintiff to submit to a physical examination, a clear
interference with the party's substantive right to privacy, the rule was sufficiently
procedural in nature to pass constitutional muster. Id. (citing Sibbach, 312 U.S.
at 14).
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tion. 123 In addition to the Seventh Circuit, the district court in Maine
also has relied upon Hanna to conclude that federal courts should apply
rule 407 to exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures in a di-
versity action despite the existence of a state law permitting the admis-
sion of such evidence.124
C. Resolution of the Conflict
It is submitted that both the Seventh and Tenth Circuits properly
123. See Public Serv. Co. v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 773 F.2d 783 (7th Cir.
1985). The court reaffirmed Flaminio without discussing the issue. Id. at 791
n.3. Bath Iron Works is somewhat unusual because defendants were the party
arguing to admit evidence of subsequent remedial measures under rule 407's
express exception allowing the use of evidence for impeachment purposes. Id.
at 785. The court applied rule 407 instead of state law. Id. at 793.
124. See Rioux v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 582 F. Supp. 620 (D. Me. 1984);
French v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 101 F.R.D. 369 (D. Me. 1984).
Rioux involved the court's ruling on a motion in limine to determine the ad-
missibility of evidence showing a change in the defendant's method of securing
concrete pipe risers on the defendant's construction site. 582 F. Supp. at 621.
The plaintiff in Rioux argued that Maine's rule of evidence was a substantive
policy-based rule that must be applied to determine the admissibility of evidence
of subsequent remedial measures in a diversity action. Id. at 622-23. Maine's
rule of evidence would admit this evidence in the plaintiffs negligence action.
Id. See ME. R. EvID. 407.
In response to the plaintiffs argument, the Rioux court emphasized that
although Congress explicitly preserved state law in some areas of evidentiary
practice, no such preservation was incorporated in rule 407. Id. at 624-25. The
court further asserted that although the Hanna test was devised to measure the
constitutionality of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it applied as well to the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at 624. "Because the Rules of Evidence were
enacted directly by Congress, their validity vis-a-vis state law and the principles
of the Erie doctrine stands on even firmer ground than that of the Rules of Civil
Procedure." Id. at 625 (quoting 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4512, at 192-93 (1982)). The district court
concluded that Federal Rule 407 governed the admissibility of evidence in diver-
sity cases. Id. Although Rioux was decided after Moe, the opinion in Rioux did
not address the Moe decision. The court based its decision on its application of
the "rationally procedural" language of the Hanna test. Id.
In French, Maine's district court was presented with a conflict between Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 81 (c) and Maine's rule 16(a)(3)(E), the federal and
state rules governing the procedure for demanding a jury trial in cases removed
to federal court. 101 F.R.D. at 370. Although the cases did not involve a con-
flict between evidentiary rules, the court cited Rioux and applied the Hanna anal-
ysis to determine which rule should apply. Id. at 371. The court also took the
opportunity to refute the analysis in the Moe decision. Id. at 371 n.3. The French
court interpreted Moe to have held that state law was utilized because considera-
tions of substantive policy underlay both the state and federal rule. Id. The
French court pointed out that all rules of evidence are based on some underlying
policy considerations. Id. The court interpreted the rationally procedural stan-
dard to "be a determination by Congress and the Supreme Court that the ability
of federal courts to govern their own proceedings takes precedence over state
policy considerations when two rules, rationally classified as procedural, are in
conflict." Id. The court concluded that the federal rule was properly applied.
Id. at 471.
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identified Erie and Hanna as the sources that provide the applicable
framework of analysis for resolving the choice of law issue. Moreover, it
is submitted that both circuits reached the appropriate conclusion in
light of their respective views on rule 407's applicability to strict liability
actions.
1. The "Arguably Procedural" Standard of Hanna v. Plumer
In Hanna v. Plumer,125 the Supreme Court was confronted with the
issue of whether rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 126
or state law governs the sufficiency of process in a proceeding tried in
federal court where jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship.' 27
After reviewing its progression of decisions on similar questions, from
Swift v. Tyson' 2 8 to Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 129 to Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York 130 and Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative,' 3' the Supreme
Court announced the following standard for determining the proper
choice of law where a federal rule is in conflict with a state law:
When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules.... the
court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can
refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and
Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in
question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor
constitutional restrictions.' 3 2
125. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
126. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1). The federal rule allows service to a person's
residence so long as the materials are served to someone of "suitable age and
discretion then residing therein." Id.
127. 380 U.S. at 462. The plaintiff in Hanna filed suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts claiming damages for personal
injuries. Id. at 461. Process was served in compliance with the applicable fed-
eral rule by leaving copies of the summons and complaint with the defendant's
wife at the defendant's residence. Id. at 462. That method of service did not
comply with state law. Id.
128. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). Swift held that federal courts exercising
jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship may apply federal common
law instead of state common law. Id. at 18.
129. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For a discussion of Erie, see infra notes 139-51
and accompanying text.
130. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). The Court in Guaranty Trust construed the Erie
limitation on federal courts' ability to apply substantive federal law in diversity
actions. The court interpreted the focus of this limitation to be that when "a
federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizen-
ship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be sub-
stantially the same, as if it were tried in a State court." Id. at 109 (emphasis
added).
131. 356 U.S. 525 (1958). The Byrd Court construed the choice of law
under Erie to require a balancing of federal and state interests. Id. at 538. Even
if a federal rule is outcome determinative, the federal rule can be applied under
Byrd if affirmative countervailing considerations support application of the fed-
eral rule. Id.
132. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471 (footnote omitted).
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In addition, the Court noted that the propriety of applying a federal rule
enacted by Congress is determined solely by reference to the
Constitution. 133
Delineating the breadth of power which Congress may exercise
without transgressing its "constitutional restrictions," the Court
observed:
[T]he constitutional provision for a federal court system (aug-
mented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it
congressional power to make rules governing the practice and plead-
ing in those courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate
matters which, though falling within the uncertain area be-
tween substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classifica-
tion as either. 134
The Court concluded that the district court properly applied rule
4(d)(1) in the diversity action because the rule transgressed neither the
Rules Enabling Act nor the Constitution. 135
At this point, the Hanna Court could have ended its analysis, having
resolved the limited statutory and constitutional issues presented. The
Court went on in dicta, however, to distinguish between situations
where a federal rule is in direct conflict with state law and where there is
no federal rule on point. 136 In the former case, the court explained, the
federal rule can govern the action without breaching constitutional stan-
dards unless the rule is not arguably procedural. 137 In the latter case,
however, the proper choice of law is governed by what the Hanna court
described as an "unguided" Erie choice.' 38
133. Id. at 470-73.
134. Id. at 472 (emphasis added) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)).
135. Id. at 464.
136. Id. at 465-73.
137. Id. at 471-73. The "arguably procedural" language is not that of the
Hanna Court. As quoted in the text (see supra text accompanying note 134), the
precise language employed by the Hanna Court is that the federal rule governs
the action provided it is "rationally capable of classification" as procedural. Id.
at 472.
138. Id. at 470-72. The Court stated:
It is true that there have been cases where this Court has held applica-
ble a state rule in the face of an argument that the situation was gov-
erned by one of the Federal Rules. But the holding of each such case
was not that Erie commanded displacement of a Federal Rule by an in-
consistent state rule, but rather that the scope of the Federal Rule was
not as broad as the losing party urged, and therefore, there being no
Federal Rule which covered the point in dispute, Erie commanded the
enforcement of state law.
Id. at 470. See also Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 712-16
(1974) (discussing effect of Hanna upon the constitutional doctrine developed in
Erie).
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2. The "Unguided" Choice of Law under Erie
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins139 involved an appeal by the Erie Railroad
Company from a jury verdict for a plaintiff who was injured when struck
by an object protruding from a passing freight train as he walked along
the railroad's right of way. 140 The plaintiff in Erie was a citizen of Penn-
sylvania, the state in which the injury occurred, and the railroad was in-
corporated in New York. 14 1
At trial, the railroad moved to dismiss the action on the dual
grounds that (1) under Pennsylvania law, the plaintiff failed to prove
actionable negligence, and (2) the railroad succeeded in proving the
plaintiffs contributory negligence. 14 2 The district court refused to dis-
miss the action and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.14 3 On
appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the jury verdict. 144 The Second Cir-
cuit rejected the railroad's contention that it was not liable to the plain-
tiff under Pennsylvania law, stating:
[W]e need not go into this matter since the defendant concedes
that the great weight of authority in other states is to the con-
trary. This concession is fatal to its contention, for upon ques-
tions of general law the federal courts are free, in absence of a
local statute, to exercise their independent judgment as to what
the law is. 14 5
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Second Circuit. 146
Specifically addressing the lower court's refusal to apply Pennsylvania
law, the Court stated:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by
Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of
the State. And whether the law of the State shall be declared by
its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is
not a matter of federal concern. 1 4 7
139. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
140. Id. at 69.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 70.
144. Tompkins v. Erie R.R., 90 F.2d 603, 606 (2d Cir. 1937), rev'd, 304 U.S.
64 (1938).
145. 90 F.2d at 604.
146. 304 U.S. at 80. While every Justice who took part in the decision
agreed that the Second Circuit should be reversed, the justices did not all agree
upon the rationale supporting reversal. In addition, Justice Cardozo took no
part in the consideration or decision of the case.
147. Id. at 78. The Court added, "There is no federal general common law.
Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in
a State .... And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power
upon the federal courts." Id.
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The Erie court reasoned that the state law must be applied in federal
courts in order to avoid inequitable application of the law and to prevent
forum shopping. 148
Later Supreme Court decisions have construed the Erie balancing
approach to be applicable only when there is no federal rule in direct
conflict with a state law that addresses the issue in question. 14 9 When
Erie is applicable, the choice between federal and state law focuses on
the following factors: whether application of federal law as opposed to
state law is outcome determinative; whether the choice of law will affect
the parties' choice of forum; and whether there are countervailing cir-
cumstances to support application of state or federal law. 1 50 Unfortu-
nately, the decisions expanding upon Erie have offered little guidance on
how these factors are to be determined, and what weight they should be
given. 151
3. Is Rule 407 Substantive or Procedural Under Erie and Hanna: The
Apparent Split Between the Seventh and Tenth Circuits is Justified in
Light of Their Differing Conclusions with Respect to Rule 407's
Application to Strict Liability Actions
It is submitted that if the majority of the federal circuits are correct
in their determination that rule 407 applies to strict liability actions,
then the Hanna analysis leads to the inescapable conclusion that rule
407, and not state evidentiary law, governs the admissibility of evidence
of subsequent remedial measures in federal courts where jurisdiction is
based on diversity of' citizenship. Although rule 407 certainly echoes
substantive policy concerns with respect to the tendency to discourage
remedial measures, the rule just as certainly regulates matters that are
"rationally capable of classification" as procedural.15 2 Thus, application
of rule 407 in diversity actions does not transgress the constitutional
limitations delineated in Hanna. Moreover, it is submitted that it is un-
necessary to determine whether rule 407 transgresses the limitations of
148. Id. at 73-80.
149. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471-72. See also Ely, supra note 138, at 712-16 (dis-
cussing effect of Hanna decision on constitutional doctrine developed in Erie).
150. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir.
1963), citedin Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471. See also Byrd, 356 U.S. 525 (adding consid-
eration of countervailing factors to Erie analysis); Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. 99
(adding outcome determinative gloss to Erie). The balance leans heavily in favor
of applying the state law if there is no federal rule on point. Oberst v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co., 640 F.2d 863, 867 n.2 (1980) (Swygert, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("where there is no pertinent federal rule, usually a
specific state rule will be applied").
151. See, e.g., Byrd, 356 U.S. 525; Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. 99 (giving no defi-
nite guidelines to determine if considerations are sufficiently "outcome determi-
native" or "countervailing" to provide predictability to choice of federal or state
law). See generally Ely, supra note 138 (discussing intricacies of Erie analysis).
152. For a discussion of the "rationally" procedural analysis from Hanna,
see supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
16371985] NOTE
27
Greenley: Federal Rule of Evidence 407: New Controversy Besets the Admissib
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985
1638 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30: p. 1611
the Rules Enabling Act because, unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, the Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted by Congress. 15 3
On the other hand, it is submitted that if the minority of the federal
circuits are correct in their determination that rule 407 does not apply to
strict liability actions, the Hanna/Erie analysis supports the conclusion
that those federal courts must apply state evidentiary law in determining
the admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict
liability actions where jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship. If
the minority rule is correct, the "arguably procedural" standard from
Hanna is inapplicable since the federal rule is not on point and not di-
rectly in conflict with the state rule. 154 Consequently, it is not unreason-
able to conclude that the highly substantive nature of a rule governing
the admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict
liability actions suggests that the federal courts must apply state law on
153. The Rules Enabling Act limits the United States Supreme court's au-
thority to prescribe rules, not Congress' authority. But see Wellborn, supra note
3, at 401. Because Congress revised the Court's version of the rules out of
concern to preserve state substantive law, the Rules Enabling Act's admonition
to protect substantive rights remains a guidepost for construing the Federal
Rules of Evidence, even though the Rules Enabling Act is not applicable to the
statutorily enacted rules. Id. The text of the Rules Enabling Act is contained in
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
Procedural rules enacted pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act may not
"abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right" of any litigant. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (1982). So long as the newly enacted rule is within the Court's authority
to prescribe, state laws are expressly superceded. Id. "[A]ll laws in conflict...
shall be of no further force or effect .... " Id.
While Erie's interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act's test looks to the
lawsuit's ultimate outcome, the Rules Enabling Act's command to avoid modifi-
cation of "substantive rights" does not. Ely, supra note 138, at 721-23. The
proper approach under the Rules Enabling Act is to look to the purpose under-
lying the state provision that will be supplanted by the federal rule to see if the
state provision is designed to promote fair and efficient litigation or designed to
further a substantive policy. Id. If the rule governs the efficiency of the litiga-
tion it does not matter if it also affects the outcome of the litigation. Id. When
the Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted, Congress also set forth a new Evi-
dence Rules Enabling Act which specifically prescribes the rulemaking authority
and procedure for amending rules of evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1982). For a
discussion of the Court's authority to prescribe amendments to the Federal
Rules of Evidence under this statute, see Schmertz, The First Decade Under Article
VI of the Federal Rules of Evidence: Some Suggested Amendments to Fill Gaps and Cure
Confusion, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1367, 1391-95 (1985).
Although the scope and applicability of the original rules are not deter-
mined under the 1975 Evidence Rules Enabling Act, the validity and application
of any amendments to the rules are measured by the Act. Section 2076 only
applies to the procedure for amending the existing rules of evidence. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2076 (1982). Furthermore, it was not in force before the enactment of the
original rules. Because rule 407 has not been amended since it was enacted in
1975, the Evidence Rules Enabling Act is not applicable to determine its scope
or applicability.
154. For a discussion of the Erie choice of law when no federal rule is "on
point", see supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
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point pursuant to the "unguided" Erie analysis. 15 5 It is suggested that
such a result is justifiable on the ground that it is necessary both to pre-
vent forum shopping and to avoid any unnecessary incursion by the fed-
eral courts into the substantive rights of parties to a diversity action.
In light of their respective positions on the applicability of rule 407
to strict liability actions, it is suggested that both the Seventh and Tenth
Circuits reached the appropriate conclusions as to the choice of law in a
diversity action. It is further suggested, however, that the Tenth Circuit
applied an erroneous analysis in reaching its conclusion.
Recall that the Seventh Circuit subscribed to the view that rule 407
is applicable in strict liability actions. 156 In light of that holding, it is
suggested that the Flaminio court properly applied the Hanna analysis to
conclude that rule 407, and not state law, governed the admissibility of
the evidence in question. The court properly recognized that the Rules
Enabling Act was irrelevant to the proper determination of the issue
before the court because rule 407 was enacted by Congress, and not simply
promulgated by the Supreme Court.'5 7 In addition, the court properly
concluded that the application of the rule in diversity actions would not
be unconstitutional because it is rationally capable of being classified as
procedural. 158
155. One commentator has observed that "one purpose of Congress' ac-
tion in revising the [Federal] Rules [of Evidence as proposed by the Supreme
Court] was to police the limitation specified in the second sentence of the 1934
Rules Enabling Act against abridging substantive rights." Wellborn, supra note
3, at 401. The author has further noted that the majority of the federal rules are
harmonious with Erie principles, thus supporting the interpretation that the
rules were intended to avoid conflict with the application of state substantive
rights. Id. But see Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, A Preliminary Report on the Advisability and Feasi-
bility of Developing Uniform Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts, 30
F.R.D. 73, 105-08 (1962). The Committee noted that the area of lawmaking
with respect to evidentiary rules, on the whole, "is not within the Erie doctrine."
Id. at 114. The Committee reasoned that the Erie principles had been modified
by the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), and Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach,
281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960). 30 F.R.D. at 114. The Committee concluded that
the constitutional and congressional policy of having independent federal
courts, and the desirability of uniformity among them in procedural matters,
outweighed the policy of conformity to state law even if the outcome of the liti-
gation is affected. Id. at 112-14. The Committee's analysis referred to the
power of the Supreme Court, however, and was written when the Committee
believed that the Rules of Evidence would be promulgated by the Supreme
Court and not enacted by Congress as eventually occurred. Id. at 100. It is
unclear if the enactment of the rules by Congress would affect the Committee's
conclusion in any way.
156. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's position, see supra notes 30-
32 and accompanying text.
157. 733 F.2d at 470. For a discussion of the Rules Enabling Act, see supra
note 153 and accompanying text.
158. 733 F.2d at 471-72. For a discussion of the "rationally procedural"
standard, see supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
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In contrast to the Flaminio court, the Tenth Circuit in Moe miscon-
strued the Hanna analysis. 15 9 In its decision to apply state law, the Moe
court failed to establish either that rule 407 and the state law were not in
conflict, or that rule 407 was not rationally capable of classification as
procedural. To the contrary, the Moe court reasoned that because state
law supplied the rule of decision in the case, 160 state law governs the
159. The Moe court reasoned that because rule 407 determines what proof
is available to the plaintiff to establish the elements of a products liability claim,
rule 407 was so closely tied to the substantive state products liability law that it
must be deemed substantive in nature. 727 F.2d at 932. Admittedly, questions
concerning the admissibility of evidence have a procedural impact as well as a
substantive effect. It is necessary to look, however, to the context in which the
rule is applied, and the purpose it is intended to serve, to determine its classifi-
cation as substantive or procedural. Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma
Facing Draftsmen of Federal Rules of Evidence, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 353, 355-56
(1969). From a prudential standpoint, "state policy ought not to be frustrated
by the accident of diversity; the allowance or denial of a privilege is so likely to
affect the outcome of litigation as to encourage forum selection on that basis,
not a proper function of diversity jurisdiction." Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Preliminary Draft
of Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D.
161, 247 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Preliminary Draft]. One commentator simi-
larly suggested that a law is substantive "(a) if it has a nonprocedural purpose,
or (b) even if its purposes are entirely procedural, if it is calculated to affect
behavior at the planning as distinguished from the disputative stage of activity."
Wellborn, supra note 3, at 404. If the Rules Enabling Act can be viewed as a
"guidepost" for application of substantive state law, then rule 407 fits the defini-
tion of a substantive law under section (a) of Wellborn's scheme. Although the
rule has a procedural effect it clearly has the nonprocedural policy purpose of
promoting safety as articulated by the Advisory Committee's notes on the rule.
See FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee note. By the "planning stage of activ-
ity," the author refers to conduct that is not related to the litigation. Wellborn,
supra note 3, at 404. One example cited by the author as a procedural rule that
affects nonlitigation-related conduct is the parol evidence rule. Id. at 403. Rule
407 likewise affects non-litigation-related conduct in that the admissibility of evi-
dence of subsequent measures is directed to whether a party is encouraged to
make such repairs, and not to a litigation-related policy.
It is submitted that these interpretations fail to recognize the breadth of the
Supreme Court's language in defining the Hanna standard of review. See French
v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 101 F.R.D. 369, 371 n.3 (D. Me. 1984). The Hanna analy-
sis gives federal courts a preferential right to govern their own practice and pro-
cedure at the expense of conflicting state law. Id. The Moe court's analysis failed
"to consider the fact that the method of promulgation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, i.e., direct enactment by Congress, places the utilization of all federal
rules of evidence in the federal courts, even in diversity cases, "on even firmer
ground than that of the Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. (citing 19 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 124, § 4512, at 192-93 (1982) (footnotes omit-
ted)). But see Oberst, 640 F.2d at 867 n.2 (Swygert, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("rule of evidence.., so intimately related to state substan-
tive law that it should be applied in a diversity action to prevent forum shop-
ping") (citing Conway v. Chemical Leamon Tank Lines, Inc., 540 F.2d 837 (5th
Cir. 1976)).
160. 727 F.2d at 932. The Federal Tort Claims Act is one body of federal
statutory law governing tort claims. The Federal Tort Claims Act, however, has
no applicability unless the United States is a defendant to the action. 28 U.S.C.
1640
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admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial measures.1 6 1
It is submitted that the Moe court's decision to apply state law would
have been better justified if the court had based its decision on the
Tenth Circuit's position that rule 407 is inapplicable to strict liability
actions. In light of that position, there would be no conflict between
rule 407 and state law, and the Moe court could reasonably have con-
cluded that the "unguided" Erie analysis supported its decision to apply
state law. 162
It is submitted that if the Moe court had applied an Erie analysis, the
court could have balanced the federal interests in maintaining a uniform
set of evidentiary rules 163 and in excluding evidence to encourage man-
ufacturer's repairs1 6 4 against state interests such as the interest in defin-
ing the "elements and requirements of proof' for state law strict
products liability claims. 16 5 The Moe court then could have articulated
an acceptable basis for its choice to apply state law. Although the Moe
court focused on the importance of maintaining the "Erie doctrine,"' 16 6
it did not apply the balancing test that would be applicable under this
doctrine. Thus it is submitted that although the Moe court reached a
conclusion that could properly be justified in light of its decision that
rule 407 was inapplicable to strict liability actions, the court failed to
apply the analysis necessary to support that conclusion.
It is further suggested that the Tenth Circuit's failure to assert that
the Hanna analysis was inapplicable to the situation before the court left
open the implication that the decision was rendered despite Hanna's ap-
plication.' 6 7 The Moe court's statement that applicable state law sup-
plants federal law in diversity cases is equally applicable to negligence or
strict liability actions. Such an interpretation would result in clearly un-
desirable practical consequences. Because almost all products liability
and negligence cases brought in federal court are diversity cases, 168 ap-
§§ 2671-2680 (1982). The Federal Tort Claims Act has been construed as not
authorizing suits against the Government based on strict product liabilities theo-
ries. Stewart v. United States, 486 F. Supp. 178, 181 (C.D. Ill. 1980). Another
federal statute concerning product liability risk retention expressly specifies that
it does not affect the tort law of any state. 15 U.S.C. § 3901(b) (1982).
161. 727 F.2d at 932. The Moe court stated, "If the law of the state supplies
the rule of decision, there is no justification for reliance on Rule 407." Id. The
issue is a matter of state policy. Id.
162. For a discussion of the Erie analysis, see supra notes 139-50 and accom-
panying text.
163. For a discussion of the desire for uniformity, see supra notes 3-4.
164. For a discussion of the rule's presumed effect on manufacturers' in-
centive to repair defective products, see supra notes 71-72 and accompanying
text.
165. 727 F.2d at 932.
166. Id. at 933.
167. See id. at 932 ("We are not unmindful of the rule laid down in Hanna v.
Plummer.").
168. See supra note 160.
1985] NOTE 1641
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plying state law to determine the admissibility of evidence of subsequent
remedial measures, instead of rule 407, would effectively repeal the fed-
eral rule. 169 If rules governing the admissibility of evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures are not "arguably procedural," then state
rules also should apply in cases involving negligence claims. Such a re-
sult is directly contrary to the concept of a scheme of federal rules.'
7 0
This interpretation would render unconstitutional virtually all of the
Rules of Evidence as well as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as
applied in diversity cases, leaving them in force only in federal question
cases. 17 1 In view of the legislative purpose to enact a scheme of rules
that would bring uniformity and simplicity to evidentiary law, it is sub-
mitted that the Moe court's interpretation lacks principled support.
4. Additional Support for the Seventh Circuit's Position: An Examination of
the Legislative History of the Federal Rules
The ontogeny of the Federal Rules of Evidence supports the posi-
tion of the Seventh Circuit that the procedural nature of rule 407 satis-
fies the constitutional standard enunciated in Hanna. When Congress
enacted the Federal Rules into law in 1975, it had been apprised of the
problems of federalism inherent in enactment of a national scheme of
evidence rules. 172
169. Under the Moe court's analysis, rule 407 would never be applicable
except, possibly, in a tort claim brought against the Government under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. The question
of the admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial measures would be rele-
vant only with respect to the interpretation of the applicable state law.
170. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. Three arguments have
been advanced against a need for uniformity in diversity actions brought in dif-
ferent states at the expense of intrastate uniformity. See Weinberg, Choice of Law
and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: New Perspectives, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 599,
603 (1974). First, because most products liability claims are brought in state
court, by lawyers in a local practice, these lawyers would be best served by a
single rule of evidence for both their local state and federal claims. Id. It is
unusual for trial lawyers to practice concurrently in several states, therefore, law-
yers have little need for interstate conformity of these evidentiary rules. Id. Sec-
ond, the federal trial judges are drawn from the state bar and would be familiar
with state practice. Id. at 604. Finally, state courts have concurrent jurisdiction
with the federal courts over other questions. Id. The area of product liability
claims should be no different. Id.
Moreover, inconsistent admissibility of evidence in products liability suits,
between suits brought in state court and those brought in or removed to federal
court, defeats the rationale for both the state and federal rule, The very policy
served by a law controlling the admissibility of evidence is frustrated by this
inconsistency. Cf. Berger, Privileges, Presumptions and Competency of Witnesses in Fed-
eral Court: A Federal Choice-of-Laws Rule, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 417, 420-32 (1976).
171. Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 471. See, e.g., Rioux v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 582 F.
Supp. 620, 624 (D. Me. 1984) (analysis of constitutionality of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is analogous to that of Federal Rules of Evidence).
172. See, e.g., Green, Drafting Uniform Federal Rules of Evidence, 52 CORNELL
L.Q. 177, 200-09 (1967); Wright, Procedural Reform: Its Limitations and Its Future, 1
GA. L. REV. 563, 571-73 (1967).
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The rules drafted by the Supreme Court gave rise to certain contro-
versies over the determination of applicable law in diversity actions,
prompting Congress to redraft the rules. 173 Criticism of the Supreme
Court's draft focused on its failure to recognize the continued vitality of
state substantive rules.1 74 Former Supreme Court Justice Arthur
Goldberg looked to the "constitutional implications of Erie,"' 75 and the
Rules Enabling Act,176 and concluded that the substantive nature of the
proposed Federal Rules required that state substantive law be applied in
the area of privilege.' 7 7 Testimony by several other witnesses before
the congressional committee that reviewed the proposed rules echoed
Justice Goldberg's concerns.178 Consequently, Congress redrafted por-
173. See Wellborn, supra note 3, at 373-74, 406 (testimony before Congress
concerning proposed Rules of Evidence often centered on rules' substantive na-
ture and on possible unconstitutional violation of limits on congressional power
to enact laws contrary to state law).
174. See generally Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm.
on Reform of Criminal Laws of the House Judiciary Comm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2
(Supp.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings] (letter of Professor Victor Schwartz to
Rep. William Hungate, July 31, 1973, cited in 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra
note 75, § 163, at 376 n.6 (1978)); H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-4
(1973); S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1974).
175. Hearings, supra note 174, at 156 (testimony ofJustice Goldberg). Jus-
tice Goldberg cited the Erie doctrine in support of the constitutional principle
that "federal courts in diversity cases have no power to create and apply substan-
tive federal law in conflict with the laws of the states where the courts preside."
Id.
176. Justice Goldberg made reference to one of the Supreme Court's deci-
sions which construed the Rules Enabling Act. Hearings, supra note 174, at 156
(testimony ofJustice Goldberg) (citing Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941)). In
support of his theory that rules of privilege are beyond the Supreme Court's
power to regulate as procedure, Justice Goldberg explained that the standard
derived from the Rules Enabling Act is used to distinguish between procedure
and substance. Id. According to the Justice, that standard requires that rules of
privilege be viewed as substantive for purposes of choice of law in diversity ac-
tions. Id.
177. Id. at 157 (testimony ofJustice Goldberg) ("Most rules of evidence...
are designed to facilitate the fact-finding process. Rules of privilege, on the
other hand, are designed to protect independent substantive interests .... ")
Rule 407, like rules of privilege, excludes evidence of subsequent measures be-
cause of substantive policy considerations, not because of a lack of relevance to
the issues before the court. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. Ad-
missibility of evidence on grounds of relevancy is governed by a separate rule of
evidence. See FED. R. EvID. 401.
Justice Goldberg expressed great concern that the question of whether state
or federal law regarding privileges should be applicable was not adequately con-
sidered in the Court's drafting of the rules. Hearings, supra note 174, at 143, 147.
He also postulated thatinterference with state substantive rights would violate
the doctrine of federalism. Id.
178. Hearings, supra note 174, at 169-72 (statement of Charles Halpern and
George Frampton on behalf of Washington Counsel of Lawyers). Halpern and
Frampton argued that the proposed Federal Rules "clearly affect substantive
rights" and "abrogate important state policies". Id. at 169. See also id. at 331
(statement of Mr. Repasky during testimony of Robert Warren, Attorney Gen-
eral of Wisconsin) (if the rules are enacted "we may be litigating cases that I
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tions of the Supreme Court's version of the rules to refer expressly to
the application of state law.1 79
The extent to which congressional concern for the preservation of
state substantive law occupied those charged with drafting the Federal
Rules has led some commentators to argue that this legislative concern
should be considered when construing rule 407.180 Some commenta-
tors view rule 407 as a kind of rule of privilege.181 They emphasize that
Congress determined that state substantive law should be applied to de-
termine if evidence is privileged,' 8 2 and argue that the reasoning cited
in support of the application of state rules of evidence in matters of priv-
ilege is equally applicable to rule 407.183 It is submitted that this posi-
have only heard about in law school, such as the Erie case, all over again, as to
the question of State and Federal sovereignty"); S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 6 (1974) (reason for delay in enacting Federal Rules was to allow reso-
lution of dissatisfaction with their interference with the application of state sub-
stantive law).
179. Congress made several changes in the rules as drafted by the Court to
preserve state substantive law. See generally 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra
note 75, § 166, at 258-66; Wellborn, supra note 3, at 401-02. Two such changes
were congressional amendments to rules 501 and 601 to expressly require appli-
cation of state law in questions of privileges and the competency of a witness
with respect to claims or defenses based on state law. See FED. R. EvID. 501
(privileges), FED. R. EvID. 601 (competency). See also FED. R. EvID. 302 (pre-
sumptions concerning facts which are elements of claim or defense as to which
state law is rule of decision are determined in accordance with state law).
180. By the time the Rules of Evidence were enacted by Congress, Erie's
constitutional principles were generally accepted legal doctrine. It is unlikely
that Congress intended rule 407 to implicitly challenge these principles, since
the other rules were carefully redrafted in support of the Erie doctrine, to
thereby preserve state substantive law in diversity actions. It is more likely that
Congress intended all of the rules to be interpreted as consistent with estab-
lished Erie principles. See generally 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 75,
§ 166, at 258-66; Wellborn, supra note 3, at 401.
181. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 5 n.26 ("The Advisory Committee's decision
to federalize the repair rule should stand or fall on its argument to federalize
privileges.") (citations omitted). See generally Preliminary Draft, supra note 159;
Schwartz, Privileges Under the Federal Rules of Evidence-A Step Forward?, 38 U. PITt.
L. REV. 79 (1976) (discussing reasons for applying state rules of privilege).
182. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 states that state law controls the deter-
mination of a privilege "in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an ele-
ment of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision
.FED. R. EvID. 501.
183. Rules of privilege, like rule 407, are designed to promote specific pol-
icy considerations:
[Privileges] do not in any wise aid the ascertainment of truth, but rather
they shut out the light. Their sole warrant is the protection of interests
and relationships which, rightly or wrongfully, are regarded as of suffi-
cient social importance to justify some incidental sacrifice of sources of
facts needed in the administration ofjustice.
C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 72, at 152 (1954) (foot-
note omitted). For a discussion of the policy rationale behind rule 407, see supra
notes 71-73 and accompanying text. See also 2 D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER, supra
note 75, § 163, at 237; Schwartz, supra note 7, at 5. The Senate judiciary Coin-
1644
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tion is not supported by the language of the rule. The rules of privilege
expressly incorporate Congress' mandate to look to state law.1 8 4 Rule
407, however, is silent on this issue.
18 5
Some commentators believe that rule 407's silence on the issue of
the application of state law was an oversight, and that Congress' intent
was to apply established principles defining the limits of federal and
state power to all the rules-leading to the conclusion that state law gov-
erns the admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial measures in a
diversity case.18 6 Rule 407's silence on this issue, however, has led
other commentators to conclude that Congress intended state law to be
inapplicable with respect to the admissibility of evidence of subsequent
remedial measures.' 8 7 As of the drafting of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence by the Supreme Court, there was a disparity between state and
federal evidence laws in the area of privilege. Most other state evidence
laws, however, were consistent with the new federal provisions. 188 It is
mittee expressed the view that other privileges that are not provided for in rule
501 should "be determined on a case-by-case basis." S. REP. No. 1277, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974).
184. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 501.
185. For the text of rule 407, see supra note 6.
186. See 2 D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 75, § 166, at 265-66.
Other legislative history includes discussions of the subject of applicable law
with respect to the federal rules of evidence in general. See S. REP. No. 1277,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-14 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-4
(1973); Second Circuit Judicial Conference, A Discussion of the Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence, 48 F.R.D. 39, 72-75 (1969) (construing Weinstein, supra note
159, at 361-73).
187. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 181, at 81. See also Jones v. Rath Packing
Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (Congress' enactments preempt state laws where
command is "explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in
its structure and purpose"); Johnson v. Ellis & Sons Iron Works, 609 F.2d 820
(5th Cir. 1980) (unless rule expressly directs court to apply state law, federal
rules should be applied in diversity cases as well).
188. 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 75, § 163, at 235 ("the exclu-
sionary rule ... of evidence of subsequent remedial measures [was] almost uni-
versally recognized"). Maine was one of the first states to enact an evidentiary
rule expressly contrary to federal rule 407. See ME. R. EvID. 407. Maine's rules
of evidence were not effective, however, until February 2, 1976, after the con-
gressional debates concerning the proposed federal rules. Id. See MAINE RULES
OF COURT at 631 (West 1985). Congress may not, therefore, have anticipated
the existence of state laws that would be displaced by a strict uniform application
of rule 407 in diversity cases. Where such conflicts were anticipated, and Con-
gress intended state law to remain applicable, Congress explicitly provided for
the application of state law. See FED. R. EVID. 601 advisory committee note (pro-
viding for existence of state dead man's statutes under rule 601 dealing with
competency of witnesses).
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, federal courts were
not rigidly bound to apply either the federal or state rule. See Muncie Aviation
Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet, Inc., 519 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1975) (scrutinizing ad-
missibility of evidence in negligence action); Bailey v. Kawasaki-Kisen, K.K., 455
F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1972) (determining that admissibility of evidence in negli-
gence action is entitled to benefit of most favorable rule); New York Life Ins. Co.
1985] NOTE 1645
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suggested that because state evidence laws generally were consistent
with the federal rules, it is likely that Congress may not have forseen the
need to expressly provide for preemption of state laws concerning sub-
sequent remedial measures. In summary, therefore, it is submitted that
although rule 407's silence probably does not reflect a considered deci-
sion that state law be inapplicable, neither does it reflect complete over-
sight of the issue. In light of the congressional concern with state
substantive law, it is submitted that it is especially unlikely that Congress
would have remained silent on the issue had it intended to declare state
law applicable to the question of admissibility of evidence of subsequent
repairs.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that under the current state of the law rule 407 lacks
the vitality to act as an effective policy measure. As is evidenced by the
recent cases of Meller v. Heil Co. 189 and Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co.,190
the split of authority remains among the federal circuits concerning the
application of rule 407 to strict liability claims. The admissibility of evi-
dence under the exceptions to the rule, 19 1 and the conclusion by a mi-
nority of the federal circuits that the rule is not applicable to strict
products liability claims, 192 has eroded what little effect the rule may
have had on the policy which the rule was designed to promote. 193
In addition, the Tenth Circuit's position that rule 407 is "substan-
tive" and, therefore, inapplicable in diversity cases 194 has added further
confusion to the area. It is submitted that the rule cannot effectively
encourage manufacturers to repair defective products unless it is clear
that rule 407 will be applicable to a claim brought against the manufac-
turer. Moe introduced the possibility that state law may supplant the
federal rule. Unless the issue of rule 407's application is settled in each
of the fifty states, the manufacturers within the states cannot conform
their conduct in reliance on rule 407. This is especially important be-
cause although most state rules are in agreement with the federal rules
v. Schlatter, 203 F.2d 184, 188 (5th Cir. 1953) ("In a federal court the rule,
whether federal or state, which favors the reception of evidence governs.") (cita-
tion omitted).
189. For a discussion of Meller, see supra notes 41-49 & 93-94 and accompa-
nying text.
190. For a discussion of Flaminio, see supra notes 30-32 & 115-22 and ac-
companying text.
191. For a discussion of the exceptions to rule 407, see supra note 75.
192. For a discussion of the minority position, see supra notes 40-65 and
accompanying text.
193. For a discussion of the efficacy of the rule in the promotion of the
policy rationales articulated by the Advisory Committee, see supra notes 55 & 71-
2 and accompanying text.
194. For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit's position, see supra notes 93-107
and accompanying text.
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with respect to the inadmissibility of such evidence in actions based on
negligence theories, 19 5 a growing number of states find such evidence
admissible in strict liability cases.19 6 In cases that arise in those states,
but which are then brought in a federal court based on diversity jurisdic-
tion, rule 407 generally has been applied to exclude evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures. The application of state law in these cases,
however, would admit this evidence. The magnitude of the issue's im-
portance is not lessened by the fact that most products liability claims
are brought in state courts. It is submitted that uncertainty accompany-
ing the inability to predict whether state or federal law will be applied
exacerbates the ineffectiveness of rule 407 as a policy measure.
It is suggested that the controversy concerning whether rule 407 is
applicable to diversity cases should be resolved to allow the federal rules
to govern the admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial meas-
ures. While it is clear that substantive policies underlie rule 407, and
that congressional revision of the rules was motivated by concern to pre-
serve state substantive law, it also is clear that rule 407 meets the "ar-
guably procedural" constitutional standard enunciated in Hanna v.
Plumer,19 7 by which the authority of Congress to enact federal rules is
measured.
In light of the continuing erosion of the vitality of rule 407 it is
submitted that there is a need for the Supreme Court to rule on both
issues addressed in this note. Until these disputes are resolved, rule 407
is a rule that lacks the ability to promote the policy measures for which it
was enacted.
Wendy Bugher Greenley
195. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., Rule 407 (Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE
ANN. tit. 26, ch. 10, Rules of Evidence, Rule 407 (1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.185
(1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 904.07 (West 1975). These state rules are worded
and construed similarly to federal rule 407. But see ME. R. EVID. 407 (written to
allow admission of evidence of subsequent remedial measures for any purpose,
even to prove negligence). For a breakdown of state court variations of rule
407, see Wroth, The Federal Rules of Evidence in the States: A Ten Year Perspective, 30
VILL. L. REV. 1315, 1332-33 (1985).
196. See, e.g., ALAsKA R. EvID. 407; HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rules of
Evidence, Rule 407 (special Pamphlet 1980); IOWA R. EvID. 407; ME. R. EvID.
407(a); TEX. R. EVID. 407; Wyo. R. EVID. 407. For example, the Texas rule
states that "[n]othing in this rule shall preclude admissibility in products liability
cases based on strict liability." TEX. R. EvID. 407. Several states courts have
recently construed their state statutes, even statutes worded similarly to federal
rule 407, to allow admission of evidence of subsequent remedial measures in
strict liability actions. See, e.g. Matsko v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 325 Pa.
Super. 452, 453, 473 A.2d 155, 156 (1984).
197. For a discussion of Hanna, see supra notes 125-28 & 152-88 and accom-
panying text.
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